

POST-COLD WAR ERA: A COERCIVE COEXISTENCE AND COOPERATION OF REALISM, LIBERALISM AND TRADE EXPECTATIONS THEORIES?

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ABSTRACT

No single international relations theory identifies, explains or understands all the key structures and dynamics of international politics today. In this sense, this article offers a new theory to build upon liberal and realist approaches to economic interdependence and war via interaction of trade expectations theory. In the new world order following Cold War, not a single IR theory has impacts on international politics. In this regard, this paper focuses on the evaluation how a new mixture of some basic IR theories affects the post-Cold War era's international relations and tries to analyze the possible coercive coexistence and cooperation of three selected basic IR theories, which likely affected each other during Post-Cold War era. In this frame, the essay will be shaped on three main sections. The first will call upon an conceptual analysis of selected IR theories: Realism, Liberalism and Trade Expectations. The second will analyze closer ties of Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism in general. The third will try to put forward both interdependency and war among them following the Cold War. Finally, we will make our comments and consideration in the context of conclusions.

Keywords: Post-Cold War Era, IR Theories, Realism, Liberalism, Trade Expectations.

ÖZET

SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI DÖNEM: REALİZM, LIBERALİZM VE TİCARİ BEKLENTİLER TEORİLERİNİN ZORLAYICI BİRLİKTELİĞİ VE İŞBİRLİĞİ Mİ?

Günümüzde, uluslararası siyasetin temel yapıları ile dinamiklerinin tümünü tanımlayabilecek, açıklayabilecek veya anlayabilecek tek başına hiçbir uluslararası ilişkiler teorisi mevcut değildir. Bu anlamda çalışma, liberal ve realist yaklaşımların, devletlerarası ekonomik bağımlılık ve mücadeleye yönelik yeni pozisyonlarını, ticari beklentiler teorisinin de yarattığı etkileşimler bağlamında analiz ederek, yeni bir teori ileri sürmektedir. Bu çerçevede çalışma, bazı temel uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin yeni bir karışımının, Soğuk Savaş sonrası uluslararası ilişkilerini nasıl etkilediğine yönelik bir değerlendirme üzerine odaklanmış ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde birbirlerini etkilediği düşünülen ve bu meyanda seçilen üç uluslararası ilişkiler teorisinin muhtemel zorlayıcı birlikteliği ve

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işbirliğini analiz etmeye çalışmıştır. Bu bağlamda çalışma, üç ana bölüm üzerinden şekillendirilmiştir. Bunlardan ilki, seçilen realizm, liberalizm ve ticari beklentiler başlıklı uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerinin kavramsal bir analizini yapacaktır. İkinci bölüm, neo-realizm ile neo-liberalizm arasındaki yakın bağları analiz edecektir. Üçüncü bölüm, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında bu üç teori arasındaki içsel bağlantı ve mücadeleyi ortaya koymaya çalışacaktır. Nihayetinde de, bu analizler ışığında yapacağımız yorum ve değerlendirmelerle çalışmanın sonucu bağlanacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönem, Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri, Realizm, Liberalizm, Ticari Beklentiler.

“Be convinced that to be happy means to be free and that to be free means to be brave. Therefore do not take lightly the perils of war.”

Thucydides, c. 411 BC

Introduction

All theories of International Relations (IR) have to deal with the state and nationalism, with the struggle of power and security, and with the use of force, but they do not deal with these phenomena in the same way. Different conceptions of the scope of the inquiry, its purpose and methodology mean that issues of war and peace which formed the classical core of the subject are conceptualized and analyzed in increasingly diverse ways (Burchill, et al., 2005: 23).

For 40 years, students and practitioners of IR thought and acted in terms of a highly simplified, but very useful picture of world affairs, “the Cold War paradigm.” During this paradigm, the world was divided between one group of relatively wealthy and mostly democratic societies, led by the United States, engaged in a pervasive ideological, political, economic, and, at times, military conflict with another group of somewhat poorer, communist societies led by the Soviet Union. Much of the conflict occurred in the Third World outside of these two camps, composed of countries which often were poor, lacked political stability, were recently independent and claimed to be non-aligned. The Cold War paradigm could not account for everything that went on in world politics. Yet as a simple model of global politics, it accounted for more important phenomena than any of its rivals; it was an indispensable starting point for thinking about international affairs; it came to be almost universally accepted; and it shaped thinking about world politics for two generations (Huntington, 1993: 186). However, communal claims to territory are among the basic threats to peace in the post-Cold War world. It is considered that the key and most urgent question of international affairs, particularly of today,

is the following, which should be addressed and identified; “*How can people who feel profoundly different from each other live together without fighting?*” (Mortimer, 1993: 4)

The end of the Cold War not only denotes a fundamental shift in world politics, it marks the beginning of a watershed period in the field of international studies. Students of IR already have reacted to recent events by charting new avenues that they hope will provide far-reaching insight into the nature of the emerging post-Cold War order. A natural consequence of this exploration is a burgeoning of studies taking stock of how able the conceptual devices and abstract paradigms in the current international theorist’s tool chest (Haftendorn, 1991: 3-17; Walt, 1991: 211-239).

In this context, the study of IR began as a theoretical discipline. The realists reflected on the forms of political action, which were most appropriate in a realm in which “*the struggle for power was pre-eminent.*” (Burchill, et al., 2005: 1) Questioning the applicability and robustness of the realist paradigm, of course, preceded the end of the Cold War (Burton, 1972; Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981). Throughout the post-World War II (WWII) order, a growing number of theorists argued that the study of interstate relations tended to center too much on systemic level analyses, nearly ignoring the role of individual decision makers and the political milieu and cultures in which these elites nurture their beliefs, perspectives, values, and associations. Nevertheless, the realist approach maintained its predominance because, in part, it provided the most parsimonious framework available for understanding the general causes of military conflict and other significant elements of state behavior.

It is important to explore the significance of developments in post-Cold War IR theory. It wasn’t surprising that the collapse of the Soviet bloc, arguably the third greatest cataclysm of the Twentieth Century and an event which drew a line under the Two World Wars, would pose some serious theoretical questions for IR. The second most powerful state on the face of the earth did voluntarily give up power despite the insistence of IR theory that this could never happen (Gaddis, 1992: 44).

Realism is said to be the most established theory in IR and was in its height during the Cold War. It deals with what is best for the state (state-centric) in order to ensure survival. This means having sufficient power to enable security for the state. A modern realist Hans Morgenthau (1948: 26) defines this as “*...man’s control over the minds and actions of other men.*” It is contended that international structure

is not determining. Fear of anarchy and its consequences encouraged key international actors to modify their behavior with the goal of changing that structure. The pluralist security community that has developed among the democratic industrial powers is in part the result of this process. This community and the end of the cold war provide evidence that states can escape from the security dilemma.

Security specialists consider it remarkable that the superpowers did not go to war as did rival hegemons of the past. Many realist theories attribute the absence of war to the bipolar nature of the postwar international system, which they consider less war-prone than the multipolar world it replaced. All of them have poorly specified definitions of bipolarity. None of the measures of bipolarity derived from these theories sustains a characterization of the international system as bipolar before the mid-1950s at the earliest.

Anarchy and despot state systems at the beginning of 20th century nourished democratic nation-states in order to preserve peace. But the peaceful states believed that war was inevitable to preserve endless peace. So, in an anarchic world system, they tried to secure themselves by making awesome defense expenditures and having their armed forces as robust as possible. That was their realism! Power was everything for them. The realist paradigm is based on the core assumption that anarchy is the defining characteristic of the international system. Anarchy compels states to make security their paramount concern and to seek to increase power as against other values. Power is defined as capability relative to other states. Therefore, classical realism, which dominated the field for at least the first fifty years of its existence between two world wars and which remains highly influential in the discipline today as well will be our first IR theory that we believe as still-valid in the international politics. Realists focus on specific images which highlights states, geopolitics and war while remaining blind to other phenomena such as the basic aspects of liberalism; growing transnational economic ties, collective security (including the idea of the rule of law), public opinion, democratizing international relations and increasing international interdependence.

Following Cold-War era, nation-states tended to collective relations, security and cooperation more. That was the outcome of a peaceful ground of unipolar world fora. Communism threat was over. In 1990s, most states were in search of living peacefully, seeking ways to increase global cooperation, growing their economic wealth, spending their incomes on social developments. International trade was increasing and that was affecting interdependency among nation-states. Every nation wanted to make trade with each other, not wars in order to live more humanly.

Nation states believed that they will be living in a more peaceful condition if they will be in trade connections and cooperation with other states due to the fact that if you earn good money, would you dare to lose your customers? So, this was true of liberal internationalists and also those of trade expectancies who believed “*the world to be profoundly other than it should be*” and who had “*faith in the power of human reason and human action*” to change it so “*that the inner potential of all human beings (could) be more fully realized.*” (Howard, 1978: 11)

No single theory identifies, explains or understands all the key structures and dynamics of international politics. Therefore, in this paper, it is tried to analyze the possible coercive coexistence and cooperation of three selected basic IR theories, which affected each other during Post-Cold War era. In this frame, the essay will be broken down into three sections. The first will shortly analyze premises of IR paradigms which is relative to our selected IR theories. The second will try to explain conceptual analysis of selected IR theories: Realism, Liberalism and Trade Expectations. The third will analyze closer ties of Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism in general. The fourth will try to put forward interdependency and war after the cold war. In this context, sub-titles such as the liberal and realist approaches on economic interdependence and war, the liberal and realist debate on economic interdependence and war, policy-related developments in the post-Cold War period, cooperation hypothesis: regional trade blocs in the developing world, economic interdependence increase or decrease the probability of war?, affects of trade expectations, a comparison of the liberal and realist perspectives and interaction of trade expectations with realism and liberalism. Finally, comments and suggestions will be made in conclusions.

Conceptual Analysis of Selected IR Theories: Realism, Liberalism and Trade Expectations

Realism

The realist paradigm considers the architecture of the global order to be one that is anarchic, based upon self-help, and premised upon state sovereignty. It positions self-interested states -unitary rational actors- as the most important players in world politics and leaves little room for agency beyond the state; thus, denying the role of non state actors, civil society and intergovernmental organizations among others. According to the realist paradigm, states seek to survive and maximize power, and calculate their interests in terms of power -traditionally defined in terms

of physical force. Resultantly, the international realm is assumed to be fraught with conflict.

According to Waltz (1979a: 24), although sovereignty makes states functionally similar, it is their capability, or relative power, that determines the global order. Indeed, as states are central to this paradigm, they are considered to be the only accountable and legitimate actors in world politics. Within the paradigm, global governance, equated to state-centered multilateralism, is considered to be contrived by rational autonomous states in their efforts to improve their standing and increase their relative power in international economic competition, influence weaker states, and/or compete for international prestige. Although they may recognize the existence of additional actors and institutions within global governance, ultimately international institutions are determined by and governed by states, specifically the hegemonic states that created them, and other actors also have states as their origin.

Although other IR paradigms point to the increasing interdependence of states as contributing to a new global order, realists such as Waltz (1979a: 29) have said that rather than growing interdependence of states, we are witnessing the increasing inequality of states. This paradigm contributes to our understanding of global governance through emphasizing the centrality of the state and importance of power and self-interest in the international realm. However, this paradigm is deficient in that it makes little room for ideas, civil society, institutions and transnational forces in its analysis, except as mechanisms of power politics by self interested states.

Liberalism

A political theory founded on the natural goodness of humans and the autonomy of the individual. It favors civil and political liberties, government by law with the consent of the governed, and protection from arbitrary authority. In IR, liberalism covers a fairly broad perspective ranging from Wilsonian Idealism through to contemporary neo-liberal theories and the democratic peace thesis. Here states are but one actor in world politics, and even states can cooperate together through institutional mechanisms and bargaining that undermine the propensity to base interests simply in military terms. States are interdependent and other actors such as Transnational Corporations, the IMF and the United Nations play a role (Copeland, 1996: 5-41; Sutch and Elias, 2006).

Kant's writings on perpetual peace were an early contribution to Democratic peace theory (Gartzke, 1998: 1-27). The precursor to liberal international relations theory was "idealism". Idealism (or utopianism) was a term applied in a critical manner by those who saw themselves as "realists", for instance E.H. Carr (Schmidt, 1998: 219). Idealism in international relations usually refers to the school of thought personified in American diplomatic history by Woodrow Wilson, such that it is sometimes referred to as "Wilsonianism". Idealism holds that a state should make its internal political philosophy the goal of its foreign policy. For example, an idealist might believe that ending poverty at home should be coupled with tackling poverty abroad. Wilson's idealism was a precursor to liberal international relations theory, which would arise amongst the "institution-builders" after WWII.

Liberalism holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behavior. Unlike realism, where the state is seen as a unitary actor, liberalism allows for plurality in state actions. Thus, preferences will vary from state to state, depending on factors such as culture, economic system or government type. Liberalism also holds that interaction between states is not limited to the political/security (high politics), but also economic/cultural (low politics) whether through commercial firms, organizations or individuals, as trade expectations theory sustain robustly.

Thus, instead of an anarchic international system, there are plenty of opportunities for cooperation and broader notions of power, such as cultural capital (for example, the influence of films leading to the popularity of the country's culture and creating a market for its exports worldwide). Another assumption is that absolute gains can be made through co-operation and interdependence -thus peace can be achieved. Singer (1971: 9) suggest that, "*By a social system, then, I mean nothing more than an aggregation of human beings (plus their physical milieu) who are sufficiently interdependent to share a common fate... or to have actions of some of them usually affecting the lines of many of them.*" Systems are hypothesized patterns of interaction. As the level of (economic?) interdependence and the amount of interaction grow, the complexity of the system increases. However, interaction consists not only of the demands and responses -the actions- of nation-states, international organizations, and other non-state actors, but also the transactions across national boundaries, including trade, tourism, investment, technology transfer, and the flow of ideas broadly (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981: 136).

The democratic peace theory argues that liberal democracies have never (or almost never) made war on one another and have fewer conflicts among themselves.

This is seen as contradicting especially the realist theories and this empirical claim is now one of the great disputes in political science. Numerous explanations have been proposed for the democratic peace. It has also been argued, as in the book *Never at War*, that democracies conduct diplomacy in general very differently from non-democracies. (Neo)realists disagree with Liberals over the theory, often citing structural reasons for the peace, as opposed to the state's government. Rosato (2003: 585-602), a critic of democratic peace theory points to America's behavior towards left-leaning democracies in Latin America during the Cold War to challenge democratic peace. One argument is that economic interdependence makes war between trading partners less likely (Copeland, 1996: 5-41). In contrast realists claim that economic interdependence increases rather than decreases the likelihood of conflict.

Trade Expectations

This theory extends liberal and realist views regarding interdependence and war, by synthesizing their strengths while formulating a dynamic perspective on state decision-making that is at best only implicit in current approaches. The strength of liberalism lies in its consideration of how the benefits or gains from trade give states a material incentive to avoid war, even when they have unit-level predispositions to favor it. The strength of realism is its recognition that states may be vulnerable to the potential costs of being cut off from trade on which they depend for wealth and ultimately security. Current theories, however, lack a way to fuse the benefits of trade and the costs of severed trade into one theoretical framework.

More significantly, these theories lack an understanding of how rational decision-makers incorporate the future trading environment into their choice between peace and war. Both liberalism and realism often refer to the future trading environment, particularly in empirical analyses. But in constructing a theoretical logic, the two camps consider the future only within their own ideological presuppositions. Liberals, assuming that states seek to maximize absolute welfare, maintain that situations of high trade should continue into the foreseeable future as long as states are rational; such actors have no reason to forsake the benefits from trade, especially if defection from the trading arrangement will only lead to retaliation (Rosecrance, 1986).

Given this presupposition, liberals can argue that interdependence - as reflected in high trade at any particular moment in time -will foster peace, given the benefits of trade over war. Realists, assuming states seek to maximize security;

argue that concerns for relative power and autonomy will eventually push some states to sever trade ties (at least in the absence of a hegemon). Hence, realists can insist that interdependence, again manifest as high trade at any moment in time, drives dependent states to initiate war now to escape potential vulnerability later.

For the purposes of forging strong theories, however, trading patterns cannot be simply assumed a priori to match the stipulations of either liberalism or of realism. Trade levels fluctuate significantly over time, both for the system as a whole and particularly between specific trading partners, as the last two centuries demonstrate. Accordingly, we need a theory that incorporates how a state's expectations of its trading environment - either optimistic or pessimistic - affect its decision-calculus for war or peace. This is where the new theory makes its most significant departure. Liberalism and realism are theories of "comparative statics", drawing predictions from a snapshot of the level of interdependence at a single point in time.

The new theory, on the other hand, is dynamic in its internal structure: it provides a new variable, the "expectations of future trade", that incorporates in the theoretical logic an actor's sense of the future trends and possibilities (Silberberg, 1990). This variable is essential to any leader's determination not just of the immediate value of peace versus war at a particular moment in time, but of the overall expected value of peace and war over the foreseeable future.

Closer Ties of Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism

The paradigm of pluralism originated during the 1970s by writers such as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, as they sought to establish an alternative to traditional realism. Through works such as *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (1973a: ix-xxix) and *Power and Interdependence* (2001: 19-27), Keohane and Nye explained their concepts of transnationalism, multiple access channels and complex interdependence which expanded theoretical pluralism. Their analyses, which studies in these books conclude that through studying foreign policy, decision-making showed that the premise of the unitary nature of the state had now become untenable. In 1979, Kenneth Waltz (1979a: 51-95), a neo-realist, introduced a new approach, through his book *Theory of International Politics*, which looked at international relations in a more structural and methodological perspective, while keeping to the same state-centric view of traditional realists such as Hans Morgenthau. Neo-liberalism being the most modern of the three paradigms, established in the 1980s, takes key concepts from both pluralism and neo-realism

but goes further and incorporates the ability of cooperation occurring in an anarchical international system.

During the 1960s and 1970s, changes to the world structure started occurring as the role of non-state actors, for example the European Economic Community and multinational companies, had greater significance. In *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Keohane and Nye (1973a: 51) argue that a “...*definition of politics in terms of state behavior alone may lead us to ignore important non-governmental actors that allocate view.*” It is clear that from a pluralistic view, states as well as non-state actors all contribute to world politics and it is this fundamental assumption, which clearly challenges and distinguishes itself from realism. Furthermore, states are not seen as the single most important actors in international politics, as they often can not regulate all other cross-border transactions. Keohane and Nye (1973b: 117) argues that, “*A good deal of inter-societal intercourse takes place without governmental control... States are by no means the only actors in world politics.*” This emphasizes the pluralist theory that states do not act in a unitary fashion, rather the state is fragmented and composed of competing individuals, interest groups and bureaucracies, which shape state policy. Transnational co-operation was needed to respond to common problems and co-operation in one sector would inevitably lead to co-operation in other sectors and as a result, the effects of transnational relations are becoming more important and pervasive.

In the 1970s, the liberal pluralists highlighted the understanding of non-state actors, undermining the state-centric world of realism. Keohane and Nye (1973a: xiii) claimed that world politics was no longer the exclusive preserve of states and that, “...*the growth of transnational organizations has lead to the state-centric paradigm becoming progressively inadequate,*”; therefore a new theory called complex interdependence was introduced to run as an alternative to realism. This theory has three key assumptions the first was introduced, being that the state is not a unitary actor but there are multiple channels of access between societies. In *Power and Interdependence*, Keohane and Nye (2001: 23) argue that these channels include, “...*informal ties between governmental elites; informal ties among non-governmental elites and transnational elites and transnational organizations.*”

The second feature of the theory is that though military force is an important issue; from a pluralistic perspective it does not dominate the agenda. The paradigm allows for a multiple of issues to arise in international relations compared to the neo-realist concept, where it emphasizes the military and security issues which dominate international politics. Pluralists have a low salience of force and believe that actors

have different influences on different issue areas. Therefore pluralists argue that military power is not the only factor indicating how powerful a state is. The final assumption considers the fact that there is no hierarchy of issues; therefore any issue area might be at the top of the international agenda at any one time. This emphasizes the second assumption of complex interdependence that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda, furthermore, with the complicated interactions between various sub-state actors, the boundary between domestic and foreign politics becomes obscure, such that traditionally low political issues, for example the environment and the economy take greater significance in the domain of international politics.

The neo-realist reply to the pluralist challenges came in the form of a structuralist theory which regarded international systems to be either hierarchical or anarchical in nature. The distinction between hierarchical and anarchical is crucial to Waltz, who argued that the present international system was anarchical in nature and the pluralist challenge had failed to provide sufficient grounds to suggest that the system had changed fundamentally; therefore underlying the reality of the system remained in tact. Neo-realism deems the anarchic system has led to a self help system which lacks authority. Waltz (1979a: 79-106) says, “...*each unit seeks its own good: the result of a number of units simultaneously doing so transcends the motives and aims of the separate units.*” Therefore, states are only able to survive if they increase their military capabilities, which will enhance their security. This is directly criticized by pluralists as they argue that liberal democracies are more pacifist and the fact that more states are becoming liberal democracies, shows the potential for changing the structure of the international system, and they claim that, “...*when complex interdependence prevails military force is not used.*” However, in his critique of transnational and other pluralist efforts, Waltz raises an important idea. He defies the challenge of the state-centric paradigm by saying that “...*students of transnational phenomena have developed no distinct theory of their subject matter or of international politics in general.*” Keohane (1983: 113) argues this critique by pointing out that for concepts such as transnational relations to be valuable; a general theory of world politics is needed. Neo-realism contains analogies from economics, especially the theory of markets and the firm where the market is a structure and exists independent of the wishes of the buyers and sellers who nonetheless create it by their actions. Waltz states, “*International political systems, like economics markets, are formed by the co-action of self-regarding units.*” This overall perspective draws its central ethos from the discipline of economics and rational choice assumptions.

Even pluralists like Keohane (1993: 269-300) soon accepted the neo-realist concepts of the international system being anarchic in nature and states as the principle actors in it. Therefore, he repositioned himself to neo-liberalism, moving away from his previous pluralistic concerns of interdependence and transnational relations. The debate between the two came to be known as the neo-neo debate since there appeared to be a convergence between the two positions. The foundation of neo-liberalism is that states need to develop strategies and forums for co-operation over a whole set of new issues and areas and this has been facilitated by the fact that regimes, treaties and institutions have multiplied over the past two to three decades. Thus the pluralists of the 1970s such as Keohane and Nye have become the neo-liberals of today and in the process have become quite close to the neo-realists.

Neo-liberalism's acceptance of anarchic principles, states becoming the principal actors and the adherence to the importance of rational choice further highlights the close intellectual position with neo-realists. Nevertheless, despite this neo-liberals are trying to distinguish themselves from neo-realists when including the notion of co-operation. Neo-liberals have concerned themselves with analyzing the extent of co-operation possible under conditions of anarchy and the conclusions that the two sides reach are radically different.

Neo-realists claim that under anarchy, conflict and the struggle for power are enduring characteristics of international politics, and that because of this, co-operation between states is at best precarious and at worst non-existent. Neo-liberals agree that achieving co-operation is difficult in international relations but disagree with neo-realists pessimism of it not being able to occur effectively in an anarchical system. In his book, *After Hegemony*, Keohane (2005: 51-63) claims that, "*Cooperation requires that the actions of separate individuals or organizations be brought into conformity with one another through a process of negotiation.*" Neo-liberalism goes further and claims that co-operation could be increased through establishment of international regimes and the exchange of information. They see regimes as the mediator and the means to achieve cooperation in the international system. According to neo-liberals, institutions can exert casual force on international relations, shaping state preference and locking states into cooperative arrangements.

However, neo-realists doubt that international regimes have the ability to do this efficiently, if not at all (Keohane, 1983: 132-158; Little, 2005: 370-380). Their pessimistic view of international relations put forward the argument that states must stress security to promote their own survival. The neo-liberal view is that though there is an anarchic system in place; institutions have the ability to encourage

multilateralism and cooperation as a means of securing national interests. However, they do concede that cooperation may be difficult to achieve in areas where leaders perceive to have no mutual interests. Thus, there is a difference of opinion between neo-liberals and neo-realists on the notion of international regimes. The former believes that regimes can only persist so long as states have mutual interests, while the latter argues that only with a hegemon in place, can a regime work effectively.

Despite their differences over the question of co-operation in the international system, both neo-realism and neo-liberalism are rationalist theories; both are constructed upon assumptions held in micro-economic theory that the main units in the international system, states, are assumed to be self-interested and rational and act in a unitary fashion (Lamy, 2005: 124-141). Neo-liberals accept the basic neo-realist assumptions of international anarchy and the rational egoism of states. However, their aim is to show that to an extent rational actors can co-operate even when anarchy in the system prevails. The issue of gains is a key difference in this debate as neo-liberals assume that states focus primarily on their individual absolute gains and are indifferent to the gains of others.

Whether co-operation results in a relative gain or loss is not very important to a state as far as neo-liberalism is concerned, so long as it produces an absolute gain. In contrast, neo-realists, such as Waltz, argue that states are concerned with relative gains rather than absolute gains and a state's utility is at least partly a function of some relative measure such as power. Furthermore, the acceptance of states being rational actors allows the enactment of game theory, thus allowing the behavior of states to be foreseen, aiding the scientific rigor of neo-liberalism.

It is arguable therefore that neo-liberalism is a doctrine that is close to both neo-realism and traditional pluralism. It is the most contemporary of the paradigms and thus has been able to take key concepts from both neo-realism and traditional pluralism to produce a new theory of international relations. However, pluralism still has strong similarities with neo-liberalism in that they both agree on the concept of different issues areas that are not necessarily military based, such as economic welfare, whereas neo-realists concentrate on military issues which they identify as being high on the political agenda. Therefore, there are no hierarchical issue areas in contrast to neo-realism where military and the struggle for power is at the top of the agenda. Furthermore both paradigms show optimism on the concept of cooperation occurring in international politics.

However, it is arguable that neo-liberals have abandoned the pluralist thought of the state not being the principal actors in international relations. Here, neo-liberals have concurred with the neo-realist state-centric view; with states being described as rational actors. To a greater extent, it is the key concept for the ability of cooperation to occur in an anarchical system which distinguishes neo-liberalism from the other two paradigms, especially neo-realism, whereby cooperation can be mitigated through the establishment of international regimes and institutions. The differences on cooperation are clearly evident between neo-liberalism and neo-realism as the latter paradigm is pessimistic, in arguing that under anarchy cooperation would be very difficult to achieve. This emphasizes the autonomous nature of neo-liberalism and it now becoming the main challenger to the traditional realist paradigm.

Interdependency and War after the Cold War

The Liberal and Realist Approaches on Economic Interdependence and War

This part offers a new theory to build upon liberal and realist approaches to economic interdependence and war via interaction of trade expectations theory. The other two approaches highlight important causal elements of interdependence - liberalism, the benefits of trade, and realism, the potential costs of severed trade- but neither specifies the conditions under which these elements will operate. By introducing a dynamic factor, expectations of future trade, the new theory shows when high levels of dependence lead to peace or to war. When expectations for trade are positive, leaders expect to realize the benefits of trade into the future and therefore have less reason for war now; trade will indeed “constrain”. If, however, leaders are pessimistic about future trade, fearing to be cut off from vital goods or believing that current restrictions will not be relaxed, then the negative expected value of peace may make war the rational strategic choice.

A few practical implications of this new theoretical framework for the post-Cold War world can be briefly noted. In anticipating likely areas of conflict, one should look for situations in which powers have both high levels of dependence on outsiders and low expectations for trade. Both China and Japan, as emerging great powers, may soon satisfy these conditions. China’s economy is growing at a yearly rate many times that of most other powers, and its domestic sources of raw materials are struggling to keep pace; within the next couple of years, for example, China will have to begin importing oil (Kristof, 1993: 64). As it continues to modernize its armed forces, it will gradually gain the strength necessary to press its territorial

claims (Segal, 1996: 107-135; Overholt, 1993). As known, China has already staked a claim to the potentially oil rich and much disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

Japan has never truly overcome the problem it faced before WWII, namely, its overwhelming dependence on others for the vital minerals and oil needed to sustain its modern industrial economy. While U.S. hegemony in the region has allowed Japan to flourish since 1945, one can imagine the fears that would arise in Tokyo should the United States ever reduce its naval and military presence in the Far East (for budgetary or other reasons). Japan would be compelled to try to defend its raw material supply routes, setting off a spiral of hostility with regional great powers like China, India, Russia, and perhaps the United States itself (Friedman and Lebard, 1991).

Russia still has significant economic ties with the states of the former Soviet Union, and is, in particular, dependent on pipelines through Ukraine and Belarus to sell its natural gas to Western European customers. These states in turn depend on Russia for their energy supplies (Whitlock, 1993: 38-42). Should Ukraine use threats to turn off the pipelines as political leverage, low expectations for future trade might push Russia to reoccupy its former possession in order to mitigate its economic vulnerability.

American and European dependence on Middle East's oil exports, combined with plummeting expectations for future trade, were probably the key factors leading the United States and Europe to unite against Iraq in 1990-91. It is not hard to envision future scenarios in the Persian Gulf involving fundamentalist Iran or a resurgent Iraq that could dictate a repeat of the Gulf War, this time with perhaps far more devastating consequences.

The key to moderating these potential conflicts is to alter leaders' perceptions of the future trading environment in which they operate. As the Far Eastern situation of the late 1930s showed, the instrument of trade sanctions must be used with great care when dealing with states possessing manifest or latent military power. Economic sanctions by the United States against China for human rights violations, for example, if implemented, could push China toward expansion or naval power-projection in order to safeguard supplies and to ensure the penetration of Asian markets. Sanctions against Japan could produce the same effect, if they were made too strong, or if they appeared to reflect domestic hostility to Japan itself, not just a bargaining ploy to free up trade.

The value of maintaining an open trading system through the new World Trade Organization (WTO) is also clear: any significant trend to regionalization may force dependent great powers to use military force to protect their trading realms. In this regard, our analysis tends to support the liberal view that international institutions may help reinforce the chances for peace: insofar as these institutions solidify positive expectations about the future, they reduce the incentive for aggression. Yet trade expectations between great powers are usually improved without formal institutions being involved, simply as the result of smart bilateral diplomacy. Nixon and Kissinger achieved just that when they negotiated the 1972 trade treaty with the Soviets. Conversely, trade expectations can be shattered by poor bilateral diplomacy even within the context of an overarching international regime. American trade sanctions against China or Japan tomorrow, for example, might produce profound political-military tension, even under the new WTO framework. The existence of formal institutions, therefore, does not do away with the need for intelligent great power foreign policy between individual great powers.

The Liberal and Realist Debate on Economic Interdependence and War

The core liberal position is straightforward. Trade provides valuable benefits, or “gains from trade”, to any particular state. A dependent state should therefore seek to avoid war, since peaceful trading gives it all the benefits of close ties without any of the costs and risks of war. Trade pays more than war, so dependent states should prefer to trade not invade. This argument is often supported by the auxiliary proposition that modern technology greatly increases the costs and risks of aggression, making the trading option even more rational (Copeland, 1995).

The argument was first made popular in the 1850s by Cobden (1903: 225), who asserted that free trade “unites” states, “...making each equally anxious for the prosperity and happiness of both.” This view was restated in *The Great Illusion* by Angell (1933: 33, 59-60, 87-89) just prior to World War I (WWI) and again in 1933. Angell saw states having to choose between new ways of thinking, namely peaceful trade, and the “old method” of power politics. Even if war was once profitable, modernization now makes it impossible to “enrich” oneself through force; indeed, by destroying trading bonds, war is “commercially suicidal”.

In this book, we see the underpinning for the neorealist view that interdependence leads to war. Mercantilist imperialism represents a reaction to a state’s dependence; states reduce their fears of external specialization by increasing internal specialization within a now larger political realm. The imperial state as it

expands thus acquires more and more of the characteristics of Waltz's domestic polity, with its hierarchy of specialized functions secure from the unpredictable policies of others.

In sum, realists seek to emphasize one main point: political concerns driven by anarchy must be injected into the liberal calculus. Since states must be primarily concerned with security and therefore with control over resources and markets, one must discount the liberal optimism that great trading partners will always continue to be great trading partners simply because both states benefit absolutely. Accordingly, a state vulnerable to another's policies because of dependence will tend to use force to overcome that vulnerability.

Cooperation Hypothesis: Regional Trade Blocs in the Developing World

One of the important neorealist hypotheses is that states will be very reluctant to cooperate due to fears about how the gains will be distributed (Waltz, 1979b: 104-107). As Waltz (1979b: 107) argues, "*States do not willingly place themselves in situations of increased dependence. In a self-help system, considerations of security subordinate economic gain to political interest.*" It would be a caricature, however, to say that neo-realists regard international cooperation as impossible. They merely view it as greatly constrained.

With respect to current circumstances, the neo-realist perspective suggests that developing countries will be very unlikely to pursue cooperation, especially given that security issues are often quite salient in this region. For instance, Powell (1991: 1316) argues that states will be concerned about relative gains "...when the possible use of force is at issue". Yet, for example in the American continent, many cooperative efforts have been initiated in the developing world in recent years, including the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR), the Andean Pact, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), and the Central American Common Market (CACM), to name a few (Haggard, 1995).

Besides, if we look at the world of global politics, we also inevitably see other International or trans-national Governmental Organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations (UN) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF); we see other regional organizations, such as the European Union (EU) or the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), important Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross (and Red Crescent) or Amnesty International, and powerful Multinational Corporations (MNCs) with bigger annual turnovers than the

Gross National Product (GNP) of many countries. Significant security issues exist within all of these organizations such as: (1) within the Andean Pact, Peru and Ecuador engaged in direct military hostilities in late 1994; (2) within ASEAN, defense expenditures have increased dramatically in recent years and several serious territorial disputes exist among its members, most notably over the oil-rich Spratly Islands; and (3) there is a history of strong military rivalry between Brazil and Argentina within MERCOSUR and also between El Salvador and Honduras in CACM. The decision of these developing countries to initiate attempts at cooperation despite these security issues significantly contradicts neorealism.

In contrast, although postclassical realism sees states as being constrained from cooperating when security issues are salient, cooperation is still regarded as being feasible if the gains in economic capacity are even more significant than the potential security risks. For many developing countries, it does appear the economic benefits of cooperation are significantly higher in the current international environment compared to earlier periods. Specifically, being a member of a bloc: (1) augments negotiating power *vis-a-vis* larger economic actors that advance assertive unilateral trade policies; (2) acts as a “safety net” -regional trade partners could serve as alternative export markets if the EU and/or the North American Free Trade Agreement turn aggressively protectionist; (3) enhances the chance of attracting foreign direct investment; and (4) allows member states to reduce transaction costs and acquire economies of scale at a time when the number and efficiency of exporters have increased dramatically in recent years. For many developing countries, engaging in regional cooperation can thus help promote international competitiveness. For the developing country trade pacts mentioned earlier, these four potential economic benefits of cooperation appear to supersede the constraining impact of relative gains concerns, thereby making cooperation possible.

The decision of these developing countries to pursue cooperation with potential rivals is incompatible with neorealism’s underlying assumptions about state behavior. In contrast, for postclassical realism, such behavior is consistent with the view that rational states make trade-offs and will favor economic capacity over security concerns in situations where the potential for enhanced economic competitiveness from regional cooperation outweighs the probability of security losses.

However, it is believed that neo-realists had underestimated the importance of transnational relations, as Nye and Keohane claims (1971: 329-349). Indeed, neo-

liberals always asked that how the reality of the global economy, thought of as a context in which states interact, effect the way that states will act (Sutch and Elias, 2006: 11).

Economic Interdependence Increase or Decrease the Probability of War?

Does economic interdependence increase or decrease the probability of war among states? With the Cold War over, this question is taking on importance as trade levels between established powers such as the United States and Russia and emerging powers such as Japan, China, and Western Europe grow to new heights. In this article, it is urged a new dynamic theory to help overcome some of the theoretical and empirical problems with current liberal and realist views on the question.

The prolonged debate between realists and liberals on the causes of war has been largely a debate about the relative salience of different causal variables. Realists stress such factors as relative power, while liberals focus on the absence or presence of collective security regimes and the pervasiveness of democratic communities. Economic interdependence is the only factor that plays an important causal role in the thinking of both camps, and their perspectives are diametrically opposed.

Liberals argue that economic interdependence lowers the likelihood of war by increasing the value of trading over the alternative of aggression: interdependent states would rather trade than invade. As long as high levels of interdependence can be maintained, liberals assert, we have reason for optimism. Realists dismiss the liberal argument, arguing that high interdependence increases rather than decreases the probability of war. In anarchy, states must constantly worry about their security. Accordingly, interdependence -meaning mutual dependence and thus vulnerability- gives states an incentive to initiate war, if only to ensure continued access to necessary materials and goods.

The unsatisfactory nature of both liberal and realist theories is shown by their difficulties in explaining the run-ups to the two World Wars. The period up to WWI exposes a glaring anomaly for liberal theory: the European powers had reached unprecedented levels of trade, yet that did not prevent them from going to war. Realists certainly have the correlation right - the war was preceded by high interdependence -but trade levels had been high for the previous thirty years; hence, even if interdependence was a necessary condition for the war, it was not sufficient.

At first glance, the period from 1920 to 1940 seems to support liberalism over realism. In the 1920s, interdependence was high, and the world was essentially peaceful; in the 1930s, as entrenched protectionism caused interdependence to fall, international tension rose to the point of world war. But, the WWII could not be prevented. We lived the gloomy years of that “Big War”. After that, Cold War years were to come. Realists claimed that struggle for power is everything to be alive in an anarchic international system. Realists believed that liberals were “utopians”. But no one guessed that Cold War would be over one day. International historians such as Gaddis (1992-1993: 5-58) stressed that none of the major traditions of international theory predicted the collapse of Soviet Union and its immediate consequences for Europe and the rest of the world. However, liberals have advocated political freedom, democracy and constitutionally guaranteed rights, and privileged the liberty of the individual and equality before the law (Burchill, et al., 2005: 55).

A Comparison of the Liberal and Realist Perspectives

While the liberal and the realist arguments display critical differences, they possess one important similarity: the causal logic of both perspectives is founded on an individual state’s decision-making process. That is, while the two camps freely use the term “interdependence”, both derive predictions from how particular decision-making units -states- deal with their own specific dependence. This allows both theories to handle situations of “asymmetric interdependence”, where one state in a dyad is more dependent than the other. Their predictions are internally consistent, but opposed: liberals argue that the more dependent state is less likely to initiate conflict, since it has more to lose from breaking economic ties (Keohane and Nye, 1973b: 121-122; Richardson and Kegley, 1980: 191-222); realists maintain that this state is more likely to initiate conflict, to escape its vulnerability.

The main difference between liberals and realists has to do with their emphasis on the benefits versus the costs of interdependence. The realist argument highlights an aspect that is severely downplayed in the liberal argument, namely, consideration of the potential costs from the severing of a trading relationship. Most liberals, if pressed, would probably accept Baldwin’s (1971: 19-38; 1980: 478, 482-484, 489) conceptualization of dependence as the opportunity costs a state would experience should trade end. Yet Baldwin’s opportunity costs are only the loss of the benefits from trade received after a state moves from autarchy.

It is this understanding of opportunity costs that is followed in the most comprehensive liberal argument for interdependence and peace, that of Rosecrance (1986: 39-41, 235). There is little sense in Rosecrance's work that a state's decision to specialize and thus to restructure its economy radically can entail huge "costs of adjustment" (Arad, et. al., 1983: 26-34) should trade be later severed, nor that such costs can actually put the state in a far worse position than if it had never moved from autarchy in the first place. Keohane and Nye (2001: 13) examine the "costs of adjusting" as an integral part of "vulnerability" interdependence. Yet they do not establish the original autarchic position as a baseline for examining these costs independently from the benefits of trade forgone; this baseline is incorporated later in building the new theory. Liberals also consider "costs" in terms of losses in "autonomy" due to trade ties (Cooper, 1968: 4-12).

This is the concern of realists when they talk about dependence on "vital goods" such as oil. A state that chooses not to buy oil from outsiders forgoes certain benefits of trade, but by operating on domestic energy sources, it avoids the heavy penalty experienced by a state that does base its industrial structure on imported oil, only to find itself cut off from supplies.

One should not place too much emphasis upon the existence of interdependence per se. European nations in 1913 relied upon the trade and investment that flowed between them; that did not prevent the political crisis which led to WWI. Interdependence only constrains national policy if leaders accept and agree to work within its limits (Rosecrance, 1986: 141, 150).

It thus appears that Rosecrance cannot really envision interdependence as being anything but a "constraint" or "restraint" on unit-level tendencies to aggress. This view is consistent with the general liberal perspective that all wars are ultimately driven by unit-level phenomena such as misperceptions, authoritarianism, ideology, and internal social conflict. Rosecrance's historical understanding of the WWII, for example, would fit nicely with the "democratic peace" literature: had all the states in 1939 been democratic, war would probably not have occurred despite the disrupted global economic situation, but since some states were not democratic, their aggressive domestic forces became unfettered once interdependence had declined. The idea that economic factors by themselves can push states to aggress -an argument consistent with neorealism and the alternative theory that will be presented below- is outside the realm of liberal thought, since it would imply that purely systemic forces can be responsible for war, largely regardless of unit-level phenomena.

While liberal theory certainly downplays the realist concern for the potential costs of severed trade, it is also clear that realists slight the positive role the benefits of trade can have on a state's choice between peace and war. In the next section, it will be gathered the liberal emphasis on benefits with the realist emphasis on costs to create a framework for understanding the true level of dependence a state faces. This section also seeks to correct the most significant error in both liberal and realist theories, namely; their lack of theoretical attention to the dynamics of state expectations for the future.

Interaction of Trade Expectations with Realism and Liberalism

Liberals contend that high economic dependence, as manifest in high trade levels, reduces a state's likelihood of initiating war by providing a material "constraint" on unit-level forces for aggression. Low dependence will increase this likelihood, since this constraint on unit-level motives for war is removed. Realists argue that high dependence heightens the probability of war as dependent states struggle to reduce their vulnerability. In the realist world, however, low dependence should have no impact on the likelihood of war or peace; that is, other factors should become causally determinant of war. Still, since economic interdependence is at least eliminated as a possible source of conflict, realists would predict that the overall likelihood of war should fall when mutual dependence is low.

In other words, both liberals and realists believe that a situation of low dependence eliminates "dependence" as a causal variable. But since liberals argue that unit-level forces are always ready to be let loose (in the absence of a community of democratic nations), the termination of high dependence takes away the previous restraint on such forces, and therefore the probability of war rises dramatically. For realists, the causes of war come from systemic factors, including a state's dependence (as well as relative power, etc.); therefore, since high dependence will tend to push a state into war, the absence of dependence gives the state one less systemic reason to aggress.

The new theory departs from the two other approaches by incorporating both the level of dependence and the dynamic expectations of future trade. It is somewhat consistent with realism in that low dependence implies little impact on the prospects for peace or war: if there are few benefits from trade and few costs if trade is cut off, then trade does not matter much in the state's decision to go to war.

As with realism, however, the elimination of a factor that might otherwise push a state into war suggests that the probability of war should be less when dependence is low. It is also possible to consider that trade expectations theory, like realism, is a systemic theory; it assumes no unit-level drives towards aggression. While expectations may seem like a unit-level factor, remember that these are expectations of an external phenomenon, namely, the other's propensity to trade into the future; the causal source of behavior comes from outside, not from within, the actor (Waltz, 1979b: 60). One might also argue that domestic and individual level factors within a state can distort expectations, but we simply assume that such misperceptions are minimal for purposes of building a deductive theory; this assumption can be later relaxed if so desired.

When dependence is high, peace will be promoted only when the state has positive expectations of future trade. Here, the liberal logic applies, whereby the positive benefits of trade give the dependent state the incentive not to disrupt a profitable peace. If, however, expectations of future trade fall, then realist concerns about the downside of interdependence -the costs of being cut off- enter in, dramatically increasing the likelihood that the dependent state will initiate war. Importantly, the decision for war does not hinge on what the present trade levels are; rather, it is leaders' expectations for the future that drive whether the expected value of trade is positive and peace-inducing or negative and war-inducing.

High economic interdependence between states after the Cold War helps preserve the peace. Interdependent economy, which is based on the use of open and free markets with little, if any, government intervention to prevent monopolies and other conglomerates from forming is essential. For liberals confident that a new day is dawning for the international system, this analysis sounds a strong note of caution. It is the very states that are the most dependent on others that are likely to lead the system into war, should their leaders become pessimistic about the continuation of trading relations that so determine their wealth and security. But our argument also rejects the stark view of realists, who automatically equate continued high interdependence with conflict: if leaders can sustain positive expectations for the future, then trading will indeed seem more rational than invading. To a large degree, whether interdependence leads to war or to peace thus becomes a question of political foresight. Those leaders, who understand that an adversary's decisions rest not on the static situation of the present, but on the dynamic expectations for the future, will be better able to avoid the tragedy of war.

Conclusion

World politics is undergoing a series of transformations. Globalization is taking us beyond inter-national politics. Globalization is something of a catch-all term that is intended to describe the ever-increasing interdependence and interconnectedness of individuals, economies and states. Globalization is a new phenomenon, which is driven principally by the rapid development of the world economy, initially after the WWII and rapidly again after the Cold War. Since 1945, we have seen the rise of international institutions, organizations and huge Transnational Corporations. The growing interdependence throughout and after the Cold War through international institutions are essential to prevent conflicts and wars. In an important sense, economic globalization outstripped political globalization, but the challenges of governance and security in the late twentieth century and at the beginning of millennium have had a remarkable impact on the shape of IR. Organizations such as the UN or the EU are the clearest example here; but there are now more than 400 IGOs that exists side by side with states. There are even more International Non-Governmental Organizations, tens of thousands of lobby groups, charities, professional associations working effectively at a global level. Economic policy, legal principles and political goals are discussed, decided and often policed at a trans-national level. Security is also a global issue. While globalization is driven principally by economic factors, it is clearly also a series of political, legal, social, and cultural developments.

These developments are not always positive. What, for some, is the triumph of global capitalism impacts on the world evenly? The gap between rich and poor has widened creating a political and economic deficit between the global “north”, the rich developed nations, and the global “south”, the developing nations. For many, globalization offers the prospect of American dominance and cultural homogenization, dependence not interdependence. In fact, it is considered that global capitalism offers American hegemony. Indeed, it is supposed that globalization is not the same meaning with the global capitalism. Global capitalism is some kind of tool to exploit the poorer world. However, globalization impacts on the individual too. We are now connected, morally and casually, through our participation in global economic and political framework.

In this line, we support that Morgenthau’s main claims, which were saying that all efforts to reform the international system which ignored the struggle for power would quickly end in failure, was in total failure in the Post-Cold War era. We also advocate that the belief in the need for a “clean break” with the old order

encouraged the view that the study of history was a perfect guide to how states should behave in future. We suggest that the spread of legitimate domestic political orders would eventually bring an end to international conflicts.

We are not so much in line with the view of realist contention that the anarchical nature of the international system means that states are trapped in a struggle for power and security. In fact, the rise of Islamic militancy after the events of 9/11 may only be a transient and disproportionately influential revolt against Western cultural authority, but from the perspective of the 1990s it was as unexpected as it was violent. This is the part of realism. Realism deals with this global security issue. Besides, we accept that neo-Kantian position which assumes that particular states, with liberal-democratic credentials, constitute an ideal which the rest of the world will emulate. Indeed, liberal democracies have transcended their violent instincts and institutionalized norms which pacify relations between them. The projection of liberal-democratic principles to the international realm is said to provide the best prospect for a peaceful world order, because a world made up of liberal democracies should have much less incentive for war, since all nations would reciprocally recognize one another's legitimacy.

Like liberals, we believe also that peace is the normal state of affairs for peace can be perpetual. The laws of nature dictated harmony and cooperation between peoples. War is therefore both unnatural and irrational, an artificial contrivance and not a product of some peculiarity of human nature. Wars were created by militaristic and undemocratic governments for their own vested interests. Wars were engineered by a "warrior class" bent on extending their power and wealth through territorial conquest. War is a cancer on the body politic. But it is an ailment that human beings, themselves, have the capacity to cure. We do believe in the same way with liberals that the "disease" of war can be successfully treated with the twin medicines of "democracy" and "free trade". Democratic processes and institutions will break the power of the ruling elites and curb their propensity for violence. Free trade and commerce will overcome the artificial barriers between individuals and unite them everywhere into one community. Like Kant, it is believed that the establishment of republican forms of government in which rulers are accountable and individual rights are respected will lead to peaceful international relations because the ultimate consent for war will rest with the citizens of the state. Liberal states, founded on individual rights such as equality before the law, free speech and civil liberty, respect for private property and representative government, will not have the same appetite for conflict and war. So, if the state is peaceful at home, then it will carry peace to the outer world. That state will be an aspect of peace distributor.

But anyhow, we should fight for the idea of that there is or should be a universal community of humankind (either moral or political). We must strongly believe that there must be a political and institutional solution to the problem of international anarchy. In fact, states mutually gained from cooperation and that war was so destructive to be essentially futile.

Anarchy causes fear and distrust. A just legal and political regime can break that cycle exposing a genuine harmony of interests. Therefore, at the domestic level, we require republican political constitutions where individual citizens are accorded equal standing. Internationally, we can end the state of nature by entering in to a confederation of republican states under the law of nations. Globally we could establish a cosmopolitan law of peoples under which individuals gain certain rights internationally. This is “Peace at home, peace abroad.” However, we should not forget that interests are above everything, even both for individuals and nation-states. Interests are above all IR theories. In the final stage, interests draw the course of action of realist, liberal or globalist nation-states. States will cooperate irrespective of relative gains, and are thus concerned with absolute gains. This also means that nations are, in essence, free to make their own choices as to how they will go about conducting policy. Not to forget!

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